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The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights
and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons
Norman L. Cantor*

I. ATTRIBUTING THE "SAME RIGHTS" TO THE PROFOUNDLY DISABLED

People have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty right to make important
medical choices like termination of pregnancy, use of contraception, and
rejection of life-sustaining treatment. Profoundly mentally disabled persons,
however, are so cognitively impaired that they cannot make their own
important medical decisions. Some courts suggest that the mentally
impaired are still entitled to "the same right" as competent persons to make
critical medical decisions. Can autonomy-based rights-rights involving a
considered weighing of options--extend to never-competent persons? Can
a profoundly disabled person have the same constitutional right to reject
end-of-life medical treatment as a competent person?
The notion of a constitutional right to make important medical decisions
dates to the middle of the twentieth century. In 1965, the United States
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut indicated that certain
unenumerated but fundamental elements of liberty, including the right to
make certain personal choices, are protected by the federal Constitution.1
In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that banned the
use of contraceptives by married couples. The Court held that access to
contraception is part of a fundamental liberty interest within marital
privacy. 2 After the Griswold opinion, cases and commentators applied the
"liberty" rationale to a competent patient's right to reject life-sustaining
medical treatment.3 A patient's right to freely make personal medical
* Professor of Law and Justice Nathan Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law,
Newark. B.A., Princeton; J.D., Columbia. This article is an adaptation of a chapter from my
forthcoming book "Deciding for the Profoundly Mentally Disabled." My thanks to Carl
Coleman for insightful comments on an earlier version and to Dean Stuart Deutsch for
financial support from the Dean's Research Fund at Rutgers Law School.
1. 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965).
2. Id. at 485.
3. See, e.g., Aste v. Brooks (In re Estate of Brooks), 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (I11.1965);
Norman L. Cantor, A Patient'sDecision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 240-41 (1973); William
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decisions was further promoted by the United States Supreme Court's 1973
opinion in Roe v. Wade, where the court reinforced the constitutional
protection of intimate personal decisions, including a joint patient-physician
decision to terminate a pregnancy. 4
In the landmark Quinlan case in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a competent patient has a constitutionally protected right to
decline or accept life-sustaining medical intervention. 5 This liberty right
applied even in the context of a patient mired in a permanently unconscious
state. 6 According to Chief Justice Hughes' opinion, "the only practical way
to prevent destruction of the [now-incompetent patient's right to decline
treatment]" '7 was to permit a conscientious guardian to determine how the
patient would exercise the right in the circumstances at hand. The
conscientious guardian in Quinlan was the patient's father, who was
deemed to be entitled to decide whether to withdraw respiratory support for
his unconscious daughter.
A number of other courts followed suit and adopted the position that a
surrogate should be able to exercise choice on behalf of a now-incompetent
patient in order to preserve the patient's constitutional right to decline
treatment. 9 The exercise of substituted judgment by a surrogate, seeking to
replicate what the now-incompetent person would decide, was seen as a
necessary means to preserve the patient's fundamental liberties and
constitutional rights.' 0 In the context of making medical decisions, some
courts even declared that incompetent persons enjoy the same rights to
decide a medical course as competent persons." Analogous lines of cases
P. Cannon, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 662 (1970); David J. Sharpe & Robert F.
Hargest, Lifesaving Treatmentfor UnwillingPatients, 36 FORD. L. REV. 695, 695 (1968).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 Sup. Ct. 2472,
2477 (2003) (confirming the principle that certain intimate personal choices are entitled to
special constitutional protection).
5. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976).
6. Id.at 664.
7. Id. See also Donald Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice:
Examining the Right to Die, 77 KY. L.J. 319, 327 (1988-89).
8. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671.
9. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 686 (Ariz. 1987); John F. Kennedy Mem'l
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp.,
482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 746
(Wash. 1983); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980); In
re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1372 (Wash. 1984).
10. In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) ("The right of incompetent
individuals to refuse medical treatment is effectuated through the doctrine of substituted
judgment."). See also Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634-35 (Mass.
1986); In re Ingram, 689 P.2d at 1369; In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Mass. 1982);
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926.
11. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423
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preserved a mentally incapacitated person's right of medical choice in the
contexts of contraception and sterilization. 12 These courts authorized
long as the guardian's decision would promote the
surrogate choice so
13
patient's interests.
Other commentators question whether the right to reject medical
treatment should be extended to incapacitated patients. 14 For them, the
patient's constitutional right is grounded in autonomous choice-a
personalized weighing of options reflecting the patient's own values and
preferences. An incompetent patient by definition could not have the
capacity to understand the alternatives and to exercise informed choice.
Commentators ask, "[w]hatever rights an incompetent person may be said
to possess, how can autonomous choice be one of them when incompetency
means precisely the inability to exercise choice?"' 5 For these commentators,
personal freedom to make decisions cannot extend to incompetent patients.
For them, the16"proxy exercise of the right of self-determination is simply
not possible."'
The criticism of applying "self-determination" and "substituted
judgment" to incapacitated persons is unconvincing in the context of
previously competent patients. If a competent person made a prospective
choice (e.g., an advance medical directive), or articulated values and
preferences that would sufficiently dictate medical decisions post17
competency, the concept of self-determination is being respected.
Although a person's prospective choice may not be as informed as
contemporaneous choice, a person anticipating future medical situations
(Mass. 1977); Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926; Colyer, 660 P.2d at 744.
12. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1258 (Md. App. 1982); In
re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (Wash.
1980).
13. Hayes, 608 P.2d at 637; In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); Grady, 426
A.2d at 482; In re Welfare of Hilstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
14. John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the ConstitutionalStatus of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1160 (1991); Daniel B. Griffith, The Best
Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial
Oversight in Best Interests Determinationsfor Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES
L. & MED. 283, 320 (1991).

15. Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 857, 870 (1992). See also Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the
Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1664-65 (1990); Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizingthe Right
to Die, 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 146 (1990) (arguing that irreversible incompetency is
"incompatible with notions of autonomy and personal decision-making").
16. Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29
UCLA L. REV. 386, 407 (1981). See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE

325 (1990).
17. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH
DIGNITY 29-32 (1993); ROBERT OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY 56 (2001).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

3

Annals of Health
Law,ofVol.
13 [2004],
Iss. 1, Art. 4
Annals
Health
Law

[Vol. 13

may still have well-developed values about intolerable suffering or
indignity that can be implemented after the person has become incompetent.
A surrogate decision-maker meaningfully preserves the incapacitated
patient's right of self-determination when an end-of-life medical decision is
grounded on values, such as religious principles or personal convictions
about indignity, previously embraced by the patient.
Self-determination, in the sense of weighing of values, is not feasible
where a patient's prior expressions and values regarding end-of-life
treatment are murky or unintelligible. Even where the patient's desires are
unclear, efforts can be made to reach decisions that would likely reflect the
incompetent patient's wishes. Arguably, constructive preference-imputing
choices to a formerly competent patient based on what the vast majority of
competent persons would want done for themselves in the circumstances at
hand-is a meaningful way of promoting the patient's likely preferences in
end-of-life care.' 8 The concept of constructive preference thus undermines
any categorical condemnation of substituted judgment in the context of
formerly competent medical patients. 19
The subject of inquiry in this article is decision-making affecting
profoundly disabled persons. How can substituted judgment and surrogate
implementation of a constitutional liberty interest be meaningfully applied
to a person who has never been capable of making considered choices or
formulating values related to end-of-life medical treatment? Does such a
person have the same right to refuse medical treatment as a competent
person?
Several courts have suggested that even profoundly disabled persons
enjoy "the same panoply of rights and choices" as fully capacitated
persons. 20 The first articulation of that sentiment came from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Superintendent of Belchertown
18. See Norman L. Cantor, DiscardingSubstituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward
a Constructive Preference Standardfor Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without
Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1241-67 (1996).

If a patient's condition

fits a scenario as to which we know people's overwhelming preference, following group
preference makes sense, at least where the individual's actual personal preference is
unknown. Id. at 1241. And we do know majority preferences as to certain end-of-life
scenarios, such as opposition to being mired in a permanently unconscious state.
19. Rebecca S. Dresser, Confronting the Near Irrelevance of Advance Directives, 5 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 55, 56 (1994); Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life
and Non-Treatment for Incompetent Patients:A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 234 (1989).
20. Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984). See
also Professional Guardianships, Inc. v. Ruth E.J. (In re Guardianship of Ruth E.J.), 540
N.W.2d 213, 217 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that denying lifesaving medical treatment to
a person who is in a class of citizens unable to express consent violates that person's right to
equal protection of the laws).
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State School v. Saikewicz,21 which was decided six months after Quinlan.
Joseph Saikewicz was a sixty-seven year-old resident of an institution for
the developmentally disabled.22 Mr. Saikewicz was severely retarded, had
the mental capacity of a child two years and eight months old, and was
dying of leukemia.23 The question became whether chemotherapy should
be administered to prolong Mr. Saikewicz's life.24 The Massachusetts court
ruled that a court of law and not the director of a state institution was best
equipped to resolve Mr. Saikewicz's medical fate and that the applicable
decision-making standard would be substituted judgment. That standard
required a determination of what Mr. Saikewicz would have wanted to do if
he were somehow competent and fully aware of all the circumstances.25
The court declared that incompetent persons must be accorded "the same
panoply of rights and choices" as competent persons because the mentally
incapacitated share the same "dignity and worth" as the capacitated.26 Only
by surrogate decision using substituted judgment could a range of choices
be extended to Mr. Saikewicz. A few courts have followed the course set
by Saikewicz and have applied a substituted judgment standard to end-oflife decisions on behalf of patients who have always been profoundly
disabled. A few courts have taken a similar approach with regard to
sterilization decisions and abortion decisions on behalf of profoundly
disabled persons.2 8
The notion, however, that a profoundly disabled person has the same
right to choose end-of-life treatment as a competent person is inaccurate. A
person's right to refuse medical treatment is partly grounded in selfdetermination-a weighing and choosing among competing options. The
traditional substituted judgment concept allows a surrogate or a court to
implement an incompetent patient's self-determination where the patient

21. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1976).
22. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 433-34.
26. Id. at 428. See also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J. 1987) (suggesting that
incompetent patients have the same right of self-determination as competent patients); In re
Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (N.J. 1987) (stating that all patients, whether competent or
incompetent, of limited cognitive ability or of a vegetative state, are entitled to choose
whether or not they want medical treatment).
27. See In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wash. 1984); In re
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d
716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (declaring that infants have a right to refuse treatment which can be
exercised by their parents).
28. See In re Jane Doe, 533 A.2d 523, 526 (R.I. 1987); In re Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337,
1340 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
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previously articulated choices about end-of-life care or expressed
preferences or values sufficient to project the course of medical treatment
that patient would have chosen for himself or herself. A profoundly
disabled person has never been able to make autonomous choices. A
surrogate, therefore, cannot protect a never-competent patient's right of
self-determination.
Many courts and commentators 29 have recognized the problems of
applying notions of autonomy and substituted judgment to the profoundly
disabled. Commentators commonly note that mental capacity for
autonomous decision-making is a prerequisite to a right to selfdetermination. These commentators scorn the application of substituted
judgment to profoundly disabled persons who lack mental function beyond
that of an infant or young child. 30 Conjuring the end-of-life decisions of a
person with a mental capacity of a child two years and eight months old
(i.e., the mental capacity of Joseph Saikewicz) would be a "figment of the
imagination. 3 1 Most courts, when asked to apply substituted judgment to
an infant or to a profoundly disabled adult, have rejected the idea as
involving an unrealistic or "impossible" task.32 That judicial response has
been forthcoming in a variety of medico-legal contexts, including life3
sustaining medical intervention, 33 petitions for sterilization,34
and organ
donations. 35 These courts repudiate the logic of imputing self-determination
to profoundly disabled persons and reject claims that a surrogate is
exercising the "same right" to control medical intervention as a competent
patient.

29. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Incompetents and the Right to Die: In Search of Consistent
Meaningful Standards,83 Ky. L.J. 733, 738-40 (1995); William L. Webster, "Right to Die"
Cases: A Model for Judicial Decision-Making?, 7 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 140, 147
(1990); Buchanan, supra note 16, at 407.
30. PETER G. FILENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO
DIE IN AMERICA 137 (1998); Bernadette Tobin, Did You Think About Buying Her a Cat?
Some Reflections on the Concept of Autonomy, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 417,
422-23 (1995); Susan R. Martyn, SubstitutedJudgment, Best Interests, and the Need for Best
Respect, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 195, 198-99 (1994); Minow, supra note
16, at 325.
31. Tobin, supra note 30, at 423; Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions
and the Doctrineof SubstitutedJudgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 65 (1990).
32. Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.W.), 482 N.W.2d 60,
78 (Wis. 1992).
33. See Id. at 69-73; In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 460 (D.C. 1999); Dir. of Newark
Developmental Ctr. v. Dillion (In re Storar), 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981)
34. In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (Wis. 1981); In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712, 724 (Mass. 1982) (Nolan, J.,
dissenting); In re Susan S., No. 7764, 1996 WL
75343, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1996).
35. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (I11.
1990).
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Others go beyond the apparent illogic of ascribing autonomy-based
rights to never competent persons and criticize surrogate decision-making
on behalf of profoundly disabled persons because of the potential for
abuse.36 The perceived hazards are several. Roger Dworkin noted that
surrogate decision-makers might act according to utilitarian concerns (i.e.,
the interests of society or surrounding persons) rather than the disabled
patient's interests.3 7 Others, including advocates for the disabled, fear that
surrogates base their substituted judgment on prejudice and stereotypical
views of the quality of a disabled person's life. 38 These critics express
concerns with imputing indeterminate feelings or preferences to the
profoundly disabled. 39 The Nazis, for example, justified euthanasia by
claiming it to be in the interests of the euthanized and to be what the victims
would have wanted if they could have expressed their wishes.4 °
Saying that the profoundly disabled cannot enjoy the "same right" as the
decisionally-capacitated does not mean that they have no constitutional
rights or even no liberty-based constitutional rights. Liberty in the sense of
autonomous choice is not the only aspect of liberty important to profoundly
disabled persons. Even a constitutional prerogative that normally involves
autonomous choice has constitutionally cognizable elements highly relevant
to a profoundly disabled person. Take the right to refuse medical
intervention as an illustration. That right, a protected liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 has at least three components: (1) an interest in
self-determination (i.e., in making a choice about treatment); (2) an interest

36.

See Aaron N. Krupp, Health Care Surrogate Statutes: Ethics Pitfalls Threaten the

Interests of Incompetent Patients, 101

W. VA. L. REV.

99, 100 (1998); Carl E. Schneider,

Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 175 (1988); Lois L.

Shepard, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay about Abortion,
Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 448 (1998).
ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION
37.

MAKING 117 (1996). See also Lynn E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving
Minors andIncompetents and Misapplication of the SubstitutedJudgment Doctrine, 7 J.L. &
HEALTH 107, 124-27 (1993).

38. See Monroe E. Price & Robert A. Burt, NonconsensualMedical Proceduresand the
Right to Privacy, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 95-96 (Michael
Kindred et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter Price & Burt, Nonconsensual Medical Procedures];
Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. &
MED. 131, 152-53 (1985).
39. Schneider, supra note 36, at 159; Shepard, supra note 36, at 440; Lois L. Shepard,
Face to Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 445,454 (2003).
40. Shepard, supra note 39, at 450.
41. See Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp.
796, 816 (S.D. Ohio 1995) ("[T]he right to self-determination in matters of personal health is
deeply rooted in our constitutional tradition.").
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in well-being (i.e., in having net interests advanced by a decision about
treatment); and (3) an interest in maintenance of bodily integrity (i.e.,
freedom from unnecessary bodily invasion). While a profoundly disabled
person cannot exercise the self-determination component, the other two
personal interests underlying a right to reject treatment-well-being and
bodily integrity-are still present. And while a surrogate cannot exercise a
profoundly disabled person's self-determination, a surrogate can
meaningfully implement the other two elements within the right to refuse
treatment. A conscientious surrogate can determine whether medical
intervention will promote the well-being or net interests of a profoundly
disabled patient and whether the patient's bodily integrity or dignity will be
needlessly compromised by the contemplated medical procedure.
The same analysis applies to abortion and sterilization decisions. That is,
never-competent persons have important potential interests (bodily
integrity, physical well-being, and procreative capacity) in these medical
options even if self-determination is impossible. To quote one case: "[t]he
interests of the incompetent which mandate recognition of procreative
choice as an aspect of the fundamental right to... liberty do not differ from
' 2
the interests of women able to give voluntary consent to [sterilization].A
This reasoning helps explain the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
opinion in Saikewicz according "the same panoply of rights and choices" to
a sixty-seven year-old adult who had the mentality of a three year-old as to
a competent person.43 The court erred in its invocation of substituted
judgment, since Mr. Saikewicz had never been able to make a considered
judgment, and it erred in according Mr. Saikewicz the "same" right to
choose as a competent person, since Mr. Saikewicz was never able to
exercise self-determination.44 Nevertheless, the court was correct in its
holding. Permitting a surrogate to choose whether to initiate life-sustaining
treatment was integral to respecting the "dignity and worth" of the
profoundly disabled Joseph Saikewicz.

45

Mr. Saikewicz's constitutional

interests in bodily integrity, avoidance of suffering, and well-being could
only receive due consideration through his surrogate. By permitting

42. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985). See also Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1258 (Md. App. 1981) (stating that a person's
inability to make a meaningful choice between sterilization, contraception or procreation
because of a mental impairment does not forfeit that person's constitutional right to make a
choice).
43. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass.
1977).
44.

Id.

45. Id. at 435. See also Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634-35
(Mass. 1986).
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surrogate choice regarding potentially beneficial medical options, a nevercompetent person has access to important constitutional benefits available
to other persons.
In some instances, a person's well-being is promoted by being allowed to
die. For instance, when proffered treatment will only prolong a dying
a person's
process dominated by suffering or by extreme deterioration,
46
Under these
well-being may be best served by no treatment at all.
the wellprejudices
choice
surrogate
of
exclusion
scenarios, the categorical
47 The same phenomenon occurs when a
being interest of the patient.
medically indicated abortion or sterilization is at issue. That is, a state
prohibition on surrogate consent to sterilization can seriously prejudice the
well-being of a mentally disabled person whose physical condition would
be jeopardized by pregnancy and/or childbirth.
The categorical exclusion of surrogate choice jeopardizes a profoundly
disabled person's human dignity interests. This can occur in at least two
ways. First, the exclusion of surrogate choice may leave the patient to
linger in an intrinsically undignified state, the passive object of bodily
invasions and manipulations, as in the case of permanent
unconsciousness.4 8 That specter of a demeaning limbo prompted a Florida
court to declare that "terminally ill incompetent persons ... have the same
right to refuse to be held on the threshold of death as terminally ill
competent persons. 4 9 A profoundly disabled, dying person may not have
the capacity to personally refuse further life support, but that person surely
has an interest in avoiding an undignified death. Second, denying a
profoundly disabled patient access to the same range of potentially
beneficial medical options as would be enjoyed by a competent patient
denies the disabled patient's equal status with other persons and thereby
5 ° In Saikewicz,
offends that patient's dignitary interest in equal treatment.
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed that: "[t]o presume that
the incompetent person must always be subjected to what many rational and
intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of incompetent

46. See, e.g., Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.W.), 482
N.W.2d 60, 74 (Wis. 1992); In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991); Orange County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Moises I. (In re Christopher I.), 131 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 122, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650, subd. (b)); Truselo
v. Truselo, 2000 WL 33324536, at *16 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2000).
47. L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 67-68.
48. See e.g., L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 68; Moorhouse, 593 A.2d at 1259; Christopher1., 131
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134; Truselo, 2000 WL 33324536 at 14.
49. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1084). See
also In re Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. App. 2003).
50. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
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persons by placing a lesser value on his [or her] intrinsic human worth and
vitality." 5' Years later, that court made a similar observation about
indignity in the context of sterilization and stated "[t]o deny this right [of
sterilization] to persons who are incapable of exercising it personally is to
degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly reliant on other, more
fortunate, individuals. 52
The story of Sheila Pouliot illustrates how a state's preclusion of
surrogate choice can implicate human dignity. 3 Ms. Pouliot was a fortytwo year-old woman who was severely disabled after childhood mumps,
which resulted in mental retardation and cerebral palsy.5 4 Ms. Pouliot was

partially blind, bed bound and had lived with her family for many years, but
at the age of twenty she moved into a New York State facility for the
developmentally disabled.55 In the months preceding her last
hospitalization, she had suffered recurrent episodes of gastroesophagal
reflux disease, aspiration pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. On
December 21, 1999, Ms. Pouliot was admitted to University Hospital in
Syracuse, New York, suffering from aspiration pneumonia, gastrointestinal
bleeding, and an acute abdomen manifested by severe abdominal pain and a
non-functioning intestine. 6
Alice Pouliot Blouin, Sheila Pouliot's sister, served as the representative
of Ms. Pouliot and her family. In conjunction with the hospital's medical
staff, Ms. Blouin determined that Ms. Pouliot was unavoidably dying, and
that further medical intervention, including artificial nutrition and hydration
(ANH), would only prolong Ms. Pouliot's dying process.

57

The hospital

ethics committee concurred. Fentanyl and morphine were prescribed for
Ms. Pouliot's abdominal pain and for secondary pain resulting from various
muscle contractures and dislocated joints. 8
That medical course was followed for several days until the state's
Attorney General's Office intervened. The Attorney General insisted that
New York law would not permit removal of ANH from a patient in the

51.

Id.

52. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Mass. 1982) (quoting In re Guardianship of Roe,
421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981)).
53. Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
54. Id.at 186. See also "Sheila Pouliot's Story," a summary prepared by her physician,
Kathy Faber-Langendoen, M.D., available at http://www.familydecisions.org/pouliot.html
(last visited Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Faber-Langendoen, Sheila's Story].
55. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
56. Id.See also Faber-Langendoen, Sheila's Story, supra note 54 and affidavit of Dr.
Kathleen McGrail, part of the record in Blouin.
57. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
58. See id.Faber-Langendoen, Sheila's Story, supra note 54.
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absence of prior instructions that clearly expressed the patient's desire to
59 Ms. Pouliot, never mentally capable of
forgo life-extending treatment.
making such instructions could never meet New York's standard. In the
wake of the Attorney General's intervention, the physicians renewed
60
artificial nutrition and hydration. For the next seven weeks, Ms. Pouliot
lingered, unable to relate to her environment and occasionally moaning,
crying, and grimacing from pain. She developed massive edema and her
skin began to break down in areas surrounding the intravenous hydration
support. 61 Finally, on March 3rd the family and medical staff secured a
court order permitting removal of all life support; intravenous hydration
62
was removed and Ms. Pouliot died shortly thereafter. Her course of dying
was inconsistent with both medical standards of palliative care and with
63
humane and compassionate care. That course of dying, supposedly
required by New York law precluding surrogate removal of ANH from a
never-competent person, deprived Sheila Pouliot of intrinsic human dignity.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM TO APPROPRIATE MEDICAL OPTIONS
The connection between surrogate choice (regarding important medical
issues) and intrinsic human dignity is clear. Do an incapacitated person's
well-being and dignity interests tied to medical options rise to a
constitutional plane? Could a profoundly disabled person be
constitutionally entitled to a surrogate medical decision? The United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged a connection between constitutional
liberty and surrogate decision-making on behalf of mentally disabled
persons. In 1988, the Court noted, in a case unrelated to medical treatment,
that the rights of incapacitated persons sometimes are "only meaningful as
they are exercised by agents acting with the best interests of their principals
in mind." 64 This quotation implies that a surrogate, acting in the best
interests of the patient, should be able to consider the patient's well being,
bodily integrity, and dignity interests which partially underlie the patient's
constitutional liberty right.
Other sources have recognized the important interests of incapacitated
65 Courts considering end-ofpersons in securing needed medical options.

59. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
60. Id.
61. Faber-Langendoen, Sheila's Story, supra note 54.
62. Blouin, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
63. Affidavit of Dr. Kathleen McGrail, a palliative care expert, in litigation of Ms.
Pouliot's estate.
64. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988).
65.

E.g., Mary Ann Buckley, Note, In re Wendland: Contradiction, Confusion, and
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life treatment for the profoundly disabled have sometimes noted that while
self-determination or free choice is not relevant to lifelong disabled persons,
surrogate choice can prevent such persons from being "stripped of basic
rights" or from being rendered "passive subjects of medical technology. '66
Surrogate decision-making that employs a "best interests" standard would
ensure that a profoundly disabled person would receive the benefit of a
reasoned choice. By weighing potential benefits and pitfalls of medical
treatment and procedures, a surrogate would preserve and protect the
profoundly disabled person's constitutionally based interests, in well-being,
bodily integrity and dignity.
Most courts that have addressed surrogate decision-making allow a
surrogate to make end-of-life medical decisions on behalf of a profoundly
disabled person in the disabled person's "best interests. 67 Even courts that
articulate a substituted judgment standard-a standard that purports to
replicate what the incompetent patient would decide-tend to modify that
approach in its application to profoundly disabled persons.68 In 1992, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the court that had decided
Saikewicz in 1976) recognized that substituted judgment is "a legal fiction"
as applied to a never-competent person. The court, however, retained
substituted judgment in an effort to vindicate the patient's "liberty
interests," which included the rejection of treatment.69
As applied to a profoundly disabled person, the substituted judgment
standard is inevitably transformed into a best interests approach. 70 That
transformation, for instance, occurred in Saikewicz. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ended up deciding Mr. Saikewicz's medical fate
essentially under a best interests analysis by emphasizing factors such as the
Constitutionality, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 255, 311 (2002); Marybeth Herald, Until Life Support Do
Us Part: A Spouse's Limited Ability to Terminate Life Supportfor an Incompetent Spouse

with No Hope of Recovery, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 207, 213-14 (2002).
66. Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.W.), 482 N.W.2d 60,
68-69, 76 (Wis. 1992). See also Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D. R.I. 1988);
Eichner v. Dillon (In re Joseph Charles Fox), 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 542-43 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980); William A. Krais, The Incompetent Developmentally DisabledPerson's Right of SelfDetermination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization, and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
333,350 (1989).
67. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (Wash. 1987); In re L.H.R., 321
S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1984); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn.
1984); In re AB, 2003 N.Y. slip op. 23664, 2003 WL 21649677, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
16, 2003).
68. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-32
(Mass. 1977); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969).
69. Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Mass. 1992).
70. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (N.J. 1981); Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 149;
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
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prospective impact of pain and anxiety and the severe side effects of drugs
on Mr. Saikewicz.71 In a similar context, dealing with the medical fate of a
small child stricken with leukemia, the Massachusetts court recognized that
substituted judgment and best interests standards are "essentially
coextensive. 7 2
A similar melding or blending of the substituted judgment and best
interests standards is evident in other cases involving profoundly disabled
persons. In a case considering sterilization of a profoundly disabled woman,
the New Jersey Supreme Court first considered the substituted judgment
73
approach, as adopted by the trial court. Alternatively, the court articulated
and applied a formula dedicating careful attention to the elements
74
comprising the best interests of the patient. One Justice of the court called
this a best interests analysis "cloaked in a substituted-judgment
formulation., 75 A similar melding of substituted judgment with best
transplant from a
interests occurred in at least one case involving a kidney
76
sibling.
ill
desperately
a
to
profoundly disabled person
This melding of substituted judgment into best interests is natural in light
of the previously mentioned illogic of using substituted judgment to
replicate the decisions of persons who have always lacked capacity to make
autonomous decisions. As Joel Feinberg has noted, a profoundly disabled
person with the mental function of a small child cannot grasp the concepts
of continued existence and death necessary to form a judgment or
preference regarding life-sustaining medical intervention. 77 The best that
can be done for the patient is to allow a conscientious surrogate to consider
and weigh the incapacitated patient's interests such as pleasure, satisfaction,
and pain. While a profoundly disabled person, lacking autonomy, cannot
have the same "rights" as a capacitated person, that person retains important
constitutionally grounded interests (such as well-being and dignity) that
deserve respect even if the disabled person cannot decide when and how to
advance those interests. This raises the issue of whether a profoundly
71.

Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430-33.

72. Custody of A Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836, 844 (Mass. 1979).
73. Grady, 426 A.2d at 480.
974-76
74. Id. at 481-84. See also Harbin v. W.S. & P.S. (In re P.S.), 452 N.E.2d 969,
(Ind. 1983); Harmon, supra note 31, at 48-49.
See
75. Alan B. Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 513-14 (1989).
Standard?,41
also Stuart Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What
RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 525-30 (1989).

Will the
76. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 148-49. See also David S. Lockemeyer, At What Cost
(1991)
586
577,
REV.
L.
ST.
CLEV.
39
Court Impose a Duty to Preserve the Life of a Child?,
of
context
the
in
interests
best
and
judgment
substituted
of
melding
(noting the judicial
decisions affecting small children).
77. JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 20-23 (1992).
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disabled person has a constitutional right to have a surrogate exercise the
disabled person's liberty interests.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SOME SURROGATE DECISION ON
BEHALF OF THE DISABLED PERSON?

In 1981, John Garvey argued in the Harvard Law Review that
decisionally-incapacitated persons should be accorded a constitutional right
to have important medical decisions made on their behalf by bonded
surrogates.78 Mr. Garvey contended that the incapacitated have a cognizable
liberty interest in beneficial treatment in various medical contexts and that
such an interest can only be implemented by allowing surrogate choice.79
According to Mr. Garvey, states should be foreclosed from interfering with
decisions by surrogates who have caring ties to the incapacitated patient so
long as the surrogate is acting consistently with the interests of the patient.8 °
Parents or other closely connected surrogates would be entitled to make
decisions as to appropriate treatment and those decisions could not be
displaced unless demonstrably contrary to the patient's interests. 8I
Other commentators 82 and courts, 83 however, have a different perspective
on surrogate decision-making for the profoundly disabled. They view the
profoundly disabled as vulnerable and subject to arbitrary and abusive
manipulation in medical decision-making even by surrogates with close
family ties to the patient. Even bonded surrogates, according to these
critics, have significant conflicts of interest when it comes to critical, endof-life medical decisions. For example, if the issue is life-sustaining
medical intervention, a family may be under considerable stress from the
actual or prospective burden of caring for a severely handicapped person. If
the issue is sterilization, the potential burden of caring for potentially
handicapped offspring may influence the family.
Advocates for disabled persons also fear that surrogate decision-making
may be based on prejudices against the disabled. According to that view,

78. John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1756, 1777-78, 1782-83, 1791-94 (1981).
79. Id. at 1778.
80. Id. at 1784.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Killing "The Handicapped"-BeforeandAfter Birth, 16
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 95 (1993); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for
Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1888-90 (1987); Schneider, supra note 36, at 175;
Shepherd, supra note 36, at 455.
83. See, e.g., Keiner v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr. (In re Estate of Longeway), 549 N.E.2d
292, 306 (Ill. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting); In re Brophy, 497 N.E. 2d 626, 645-46 (Mass.
1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
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the surrogate may underestimate the disabled person's quality of life and
84
make end-of-life decisions based on social and personal stereotypes.
Because of the perceived hazards of exploitation of vulnerable populations
like the profoundly disabled, certain advocates would foreclose whole
categories of decisions-such as removal of life support or sterilization85
from the hands of surrogate decision-makers.
Can Mr. Garvey's argument that an incapacitated person has a
constitutional right to a surrogate decision prevail in the face of these
concerns by advocates for the disabled? Is a state constitutionally compelled
to allow a surrogate to assess and exercise a profoundly disabled person's
interests in important medical issues? May a state foreclose surrogate
decision-making in potentially hazardous subject areas such as end-of-life
care and sterilization?
Apprehensions about sterilization are most understandable in light of its
long and checkered history. Between 1900 and 1930, the eugenics
movement peaked in the United States. Concerned with improving the
hereditary quality of future generations, eugenics advocates influenced state
legislatures to pass involuntary sterilization laws that primarily targeted the
86 In 1907, Indiana was the
"feebleminded" residents of state institutions.
first state to adopt such laws. By 1940, approximately thirty-two states
followed suit. 87 By preventing "feebleminded" persons from procreating,
the states supposedly protected society from supporting potentially
handicapped offspring whose dependency and antisocial behaviors would
burden the state.88 Preventing misery and suffering to prospective offspring
84. Field, supra note 82, at 89; Price & Burt, Nonconsensual Medical Procedures,supra
note 38, at 93.
85. See Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1272 (Mass. 1992) (Nolan, J.,
dissenting):
The possibilities that [the patient] wishes to terminate the provision of food and
water is no more likely than the possibility that she fears this action and hopes, in
her helpless state, that society will continue to meet her basic needs. Given this
reality, where lies the logic, moral and ethical justification for depriving her of
food and water?
See also In re Finn, 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). The federal government
has sought to limit medical decision-making for handicapped newborns. In 1984, HHS
adopted the famous "Baby Doe" regulations seeking to limit circumstances in which life
to
support is withheld from severely stricken infants. The regulations required states
treatment.
medical
denied
being
newborns
of
reports
any
institute systems to respond to
Those regulations were invalidated in Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610
(1986), but newer regulations exist.
86. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
andFamily Privacy, 1986 DuKE L. J. 806, 809-813 (1986).
87. JONAS B. ROBITSCHER, EUGENIC STERILIZATION 9-14 (Jonas Robitscher & Charles C.
Thomas eds., 1973).
88. Id. at4.
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was another rationale for the legislation, under the assumption that
feebleminded parents could not adequately rear children. 89 By imposing
sterilization, the laws also supposedly promoted the well-being of the
"feebleminded" who might have thrived without the burdens of parenthood.
While some state courts invalidated local involuntary sterilization
statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Virginia sterilization statute in
1927.90 Thereafter, sterilization statutes survived constitutional attack in
many states, a few as late as the 1970s. 91 As many as 60,000 people were
involuntarily sterilized during the first half of the twentieth century. 92
By the second half of the twentieth century, the attitude toward
compulsory sterilization had dramatically changed.
The scientific
underpinnings of the eugenics movement were in disrepute. 93 The
perception had grown that any effort to sterilize in wholesale fashion the
institutionalized mentally retarded was grounded in prejudice and
stereotyped images of sexual predators or creatures with uncontrolled
sexual appetites.9 4 Commentators cast doubt on the constitutional viability
of non-voluntary sterilization laws both because of evolving Supreme Court
jurisprudence protecting procreational choice and because of the "potential
for social oppression and invidious discrimination" embodied in such
laws. 95 Many of the statutes providing for compulsory sterilization had
lapsed, been repealed, or fallen into disuse by the 1950s.
The central issue in the 1960s and 1970s became whether courts had
inherent jurisdiction to authorize parents or other guardians to consent to
sterilization on behalf of profoundly disabled persons. During that period,
the predominant judicial response was negative-a series of rulings that the
courts lacked authority to authorize such operations, at least in the absence
of enabling legislation.96 These courts had a lingering revulsion toward the
89.
90.
91.
(M.D.

Id. at 10-12.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
See N. C. Ass'n For Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457-58
N.C. 1976); Cook v. Or., 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (Or. Ct. App. 1972); Erika T. Blum,

When TerminatingParentalRights is Not Enough: A New Look at Compulsory Sterilization,

28 GA. L. REv. 977, 989, 1000-05 (1994). See also In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206, 208
(Ohio Law Abs. 1962).
92. Price & Burt, Nonconsensual MedicalProcedures,supra note 38, at 97.
93. Donald Giannella, Eugenic Sterilization and the Law, in EUGENIC STERILIZATION 7475 (Jonas Robitscher & Charles C. Thomas eds., 1973).
94. Price & Burt, Nonconsensual Medical Procedures,supra note 38, at 97-98.
95. Giannella, supra note 93, at 73, 75.
96. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d
467, 471 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Holmes v.
Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. 1968); In re D.D., 408 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind. App. 1975); Thomas R. Trenkner,
Annotation, Jurisdiction of Court to Permit Sterilization of Mentally Defective Person in
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period when large numbers of mentally retarded people had been
involuntarily sterilized despite the shaky basis of the underlying eugenic
theory and its shoddy application in practice.97 By the late 1960s and early
1970s, procreation was well established as a fundamental aspect of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 A number of courts therefore expressed
special reluctance to authorize sterilization of a disabled person-a possible
deprivation of a constitutional prerogative-even when the parents or
guardian argued that sterilization would be in the patient's best interest. 99
Today, most of the states that had refused in the 1970s to find inherent
jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of a mentally disabled person have
changed their law; statutes now permit sterilization where a court finds that
the surgery will serve the incapacitated person's best interests. Only one
state appears to continue to exclude all surrogate authorization of
sterilization.100 This evolution in the jurisprudence of surrogate decisionmaking regarding sterilization leaves unresolved the question of the
constitutionality of state prohibitions of surrogate consent to important
medical matters such as sterilization.
A similar constitutional question can be raised about the severe
restrictions that several states have imposed on surrogate decisions to
withhold life-sustaining medical care from profoundly disabled persons.'l '
The first of several important court decisions restricting such surrogate
decision-making was issued in a 1981 case before the New York Court of
Appeals, Soper v. Storar (In re Storar).10 2 The patient, John Storar, was a
fifty-two year-old profoundly retarded man dying of bladder cancer.10 3 His

Absence of Specific Statutory Authority, 74 A.L.R. 3d 1210, 1213 (1999). But see In re
Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Law Abs. 1962); Jessin v. Shasta, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969).
97. Questions existed not only about the hereditability of conditions, but whether the
patients actually had the suspect conditions. For example, research indicates that Carrie
Buck, the focus of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), was not in fact mentally handicapped.
See Roberta M. Berry, From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic Enhancement: The
Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 401, 420-21

(1998).
98. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
99. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
100.
MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 87 (1999).

101. See Wendland v. Wendland (Conservatorship of Wendland), 28 P.3d 152, 175 (Cal.
2001); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Ky. 1993); Martin v. Martin (In re Martin),
538 N.W.2d 399, 410 (Mich. 1999); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988); In
re Westchester County Medical Center, 531 N.E.2d 607, 615 (N.Y. 1988); Spahn v.
Eisenberg (Guardianship of Edna M.F.), 543 N.W.2d 485, 491-92 (Wis. 1997).
102. Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981).
103. Id. at 66.
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mother, who had been appointed his legal guardian, opposed continuation
of blood transfusions because they caused Storar extreme pain and
discomfort.1 n The court refused to defer to the mother's decision to cease
treatment. The court was reluctant to endorse an end to life-sustaining care
absent the patient's choice, and thus ordered treatment to continue contrary
to the determination of Storar's mother. 10 5
The New York courts again applied a restrictive approach in 1988.106
The patient, Mary O'Connor, was a seventy-seven year-old woman who
had suffered a series of devastating strokes leaving her totally helpless and
barely conscious, unable to recognize and relate to her surrounding loved
ones or caretakers. 10 7 Her daughters opposed installation of tubes providing
artificial nutrition and hydration, arguing that this formerly vital woman
would never have wanted to be maintained in this totally debilitated
status. 10 8 In support of their opposition, O'Connor's daughters testified to
statements that O'Connor had made indicating her desire not to be
"sustained artificially ... if she could not take care of herself and make her
own decisions. ' 9 Nonetheless the court ruled against the daughters. 110
According to Chief Judge Saul Wachtler, writing for the court, it would be
"unacceptable" to remove an incapacitated patient from life support without
clear and convincing evidence that the patient had chosen such a course
while still competent."' The court held that Mrs. O'Connor's statements
had been too casually made to constitute clear and convincing evidence that
she truly would have wanted life support removed under the
circumstances.'
As a matter of policy, the court seemed motivated by one
primary concern: the potential that unfettered surrogate discretion would
result in the abuse or exploitation of incapacitated patients unable to
articulate their needs or desires.1 3 Judge Wachtler asserted that "no person
or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable
'
quality of life for another." 14
Since 1988, several other state courts have joined New York in
demanding clear and convincing evidence of the incapacitated patient's

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 72-73.
In re Westchester Medical Center, 531 N.E.2d 607, 615 (N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at611.
Id.
Id. at613.
Id.
In re Westchester Med. Ctr, 531 N.E.2d at 614.
Id.
Id. at 613.
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prior preferences before allowing withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
intervention." 5 While a few of these courts have attenuated the impact of
this more restrictive approach by limiting its application only to conscious
patients,"16 the impact is nevertheless devastating, particularly to conscious
patients who have always been profoundly disabled and have thus never
been capable of expressing a preference as to medical treatment. These
patients risk having their interests ignored under a standard predicated
entirely on the existence or non-existence of prior expressions.
The consequences of this restrictive approach to end-of-life care will be
addressed infra. Note, however, that a restrictive approach to terminal
decisions raises a constitutional issue similar to that raised by the exclusion
of sterilization from surrogate decision-making. Does wholesale exclusion
of a subject matter from surrogate decision-making violate a profoundly
disabled person's liberty interest when the person stands to benefit from the
surrogate's decision?
A series of cases decided through the 1980s, in the contexts of both endof-life and sterilization decisions, support the notion that a decisionallyincapacitated person has a constitutional right to have a surrogate choose
medical treatment. Recall that in 1977 the Saikewicz court held that a dying,
profoundly disabled cancer patient should have the "same panoply of rights
and choices" as an autonomous patient." 7 That idea flourished in the 1980s,
signaling a possible evolution in patient-choice jurisprudence. One of the
first steps in this evolution was In re Grady, a sterilization case decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1981.' " 8 Lee Ann Grady was a nineteenyear-old who was so severely mentally impaired by Down's syndrome that
she could not understand pregnancy and would never be able to care for a
child. 1 9 Ms. Grady's parents sought judicial approval of sterilization,
arguing that her best interests would be served by affording her permanent
115. See Wendland v. Wendland (Conservatorship of Wendland), 28 P.3d 152, 175 (Cal.
2001); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744,
753 (Md. 1993); Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 538 N.W.2d 399, 410 (Mich. 1999);
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988); Spahn v. Eisenberg (Guardianship of
Edna M.F.), 543 N.W.2d 485, 491-92 (Wis. 1997).
116. Spahn v. Eisenberg (Guardianship of Edna M.F.), 543 N.W.2d 485, 491-92 (Wis.
1997); Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 538 N.W.2d 399, 410 (Mich. 1999).
117. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(Mass. 1976).
118. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981). Earlier cases had upheld the
jurisdiction of courts to authorize sterilizations sought by parents and guardians on behalf of
profoundly disabled charges. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 368 (D. Conn. 1978); In re
Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206, 208
(Ohio Prob. Ct. 1962). However, Grady became particularly influential, in part because of
the court's carefully considered analysis.
119. Grady, 426 A.2d at 469-70.
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and reliable birth control allowing her to move from her family home into
12
an adult group home without any concerns about inadvertent pregnancy. 0
Writing for the Court, Justice Morris Pashman presented the issue as how to
"preserve the personal freedom of one incapable of exercising it by
allowing others to make a profoundly personal decision on her behalf." 12'
Justice Pashman understood that Ms. Grady could never exercise
autonomous choice, but that her freedom to have a surrogate make a
beneficial choice on her behalf was critical both to Ms. Grady's well-being
and her constitutional interests. 122 He recognized that Ms. Grady had two
interconnected liberty interests, a right to procreate and a right not to
procreate, 123 and observed that a competent person has a constitutional right
to choose between the two options in pursuit of her well-being. 124 To
Justice Pashman, a disabled person's inability to choose for herself "should
not result in the forfeit of this constitutional interest [procreating or not
procreating] or of the effective protection of her 'best interests'.' 25 Thus,
the court recognized surrogate choice as the only way to assure Ms. Grady
of the benefits of a considered decision about her reproductive future and
her well-being. 126 The court ruled: "When an incompetent person lacks the
mental capacity to make that choice [regarding sterilization] a court should
ensure the exercise of that right [liberty to procreate or not to procreate] on
behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or her best
interests.' 27 Thus, the court adopted the best interests standard on the
assumption that a never-competent person would want to have her interests
protected by a surrogate making appropriate medical decisions on her
behalf:
We do not pretend that the choice of [Lee Ann's] parents, her guardian ad
litem or a court is her own choice. But it is a genuine choice
nonetheless--one designed to further the same interests she might pursue
had she the ability to decide herself. We believe that having the choice

120. Id. at 470.
121. Id. at469.
122. Id. at481.
123. Id. at 475. Sterilization is just one instance in which a medical choice implicates
fundamental constitutional interests, however the choice is exercised. Just as a decision to
submit to sterilization promotes one constitutional interest (non-procreation) while
sacrificing another (procreation), a decision to choose heart surgery promotes one interest
(life) while sacrificing another (the right to reject life-sustaining treatment and thus to
preserve bodily integrity).
124. Id.at 474.
125. Grady, 426 A.2d at 474.
126. Id. at 480-81.
127.

Id.at 475.
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128 than
made on her behalf produces a more just and compassionate
• . • result
right.
leaving Lee Ann with no way of exercising a constitutional

aimed at preventing exploitation by the
The Court also dictated safeguards
29
decision-maker.
surrogate
Several courts adopted the view articulated in Grady that failure to
permit surrogate choice regarding sterilization would deny a patient's
constitutional right to reproductive choice and might seriously jeopardize a
disabled patient's well being. 30 For example, just one year after Grady the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that equity courts have inherent
authority to act in a mentally disabled person's best interests, including by
authorizing sterilization.131 The opinion explained: "government deprives a
mentally retarded individual of his or her [constitutional] right to privacy if
it denies the person the opportunity to exercise that right [by means of a
conscientious surrogate considering various means of contraception]."1
Three years later the California Supreme Court used similar reasoning to
strike down a statute that had prohibited conservators (guardians) from
3
making sterilization decisions for mentally disabled people.' 3 In Mildred
G. v. Valerie N. (Conservatorship of Valerie N.), the court held that the
legislature's prohibition had deprived developmentally disabled persons of
their fundamental liberty interest in procreative choice in violation of both
the federal and state constitutions.134 The court noted that what was at stake
was not only the disabled person's constitutional interests, but also her
practical interests in a procreative decision that would best promote her
personal growth and development. 35 According to the majority opinion:
"An incompetent developmentally disabled woman has no less interest in a
satisfying or fulfilling life free from the burdens of an unwanted pregnancy

128. Id. at 481.
129. Id. at 482-83. These safeguards will be detailed and discussed infra.
130. See Edward J. Larson & Leonard J.Nelson, Involuntary Sexual Sterilization of
Incompetents in Alabama: Past, Present, & Future, 43 ALA. L. REV. 399, 431 n.188 (1992)
(listing cases). See also John Hackett, Note, Procreative Choice for the Incompetent
Developmentally Disabled: Conservatorship of Valerie N., 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 95, 102-03,
111 (1986). But see Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood County (In re Eberhardy), 307
N.W.2d 881, 899 (Wis. 1981) (finding no jurisdiction to authorize a guardian's choice of
sterilization for a profoundly disabled ward).
131. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Mass. 1982). See also Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hospital, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 1982).
132. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Mass. 1982).
133. Mildred G. v. Valerie N. (Conservatorship of Valerie N.), 707 P.2d 760, 777 (Cal.
1985).
134. Id.at 777.
135. Id. at 773.
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than does her competent sister. 1 36 In effect, the California Supreme Court
found that a profoundly disabled person has a constitutional right to have a
critically important medical decision made on her behalf.
A California appellate court employed similar reasoning in 1988 in the
context of an end-of-life decision on behalf of an incompetent patient.37
The patient, William Drabick, was, at the age of forty-four, mired in
permanent unconsciousness as a result of severe brain damage suffered in
an automobile accident several years earlier. 138 His brother as conservator
(guardian) sought judicial approval to remove a life-sustaining feeding
tube. 139 The appellate court ruled that Mr. Drabick had a right to have a
surrogate decide whether to continue life support according to a standard
that reflected Mr. Drabick's interests. 140 The court acknowledged that Mr.
Drabick had not made a conscious choice, and was incapable of doing so,
therefore the invocation of a "right to choose" was a legal fiction.14' The
court nevertheless held that Mr. Drabick's interest in sound medical
treatment decisions was so critical that it should not be vitiated by his
incapacity to choose. 42 The court explained: "It would be more accurate to
say that incompetent patients retain the right to have appropriate medical
decisions made on their behalf. An appropriate medical decision is one that
is made in the patient's best interests, as opposed to the interests of the
' 43
hospital, the physician, the legal system, or someone else.'
Drabick was important because it furthered the propositions that
surrogate choice reflecting the patient's interests should prevail over the
technological imperative to preserve life at all costs, and that upholding
surrogate choice was a necessary extension of respect for persons. 144 The
court sought to assure that all patients, both competent and incompetent,
136. Id.
137. Drabick v. Drabick (Conservatorship of Drabick), 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 860-61 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988), review denied, July 28, 1988.
138. Id.at 842.
139. Id.at 842-43.
140. Id.at 855. But see Wendland v. Wendland (Conservatorship of Wendland), 28
P.3d 151, 162-63 (Cal. 2001) (approving the Drabick court's holding that incompetent
persons have a right to "medical decisions that reflect their own interests and values," but
noting that the right does not "equate with the conservatee's right to refuse treatment"). The
court interpreted a revised version of the statute under which Drabick had been decided,
holding that a court was correct in refusing permission to withdraw life-sustaining nutrition
where a conservator has not proven by clear and convincing evidence either that the
conservatee wished to refuse nutrition or that withholding such nutrition was in the
conservatee's best interest.
141. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
142. Id.at 855.
143. Id.at 852.
144. Id.at 854-55.
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would be allowed the exercise of treatment options that would advance their
personal interests. 45 The court's equation of surrogate choice with respect
for the individual drew on an important theme first articulated in Saikewicz
in 1977 and reiterated in Moe and Valerie N.: governmental exclusion of a
potentially beneficial medical option treats the incapacitated patient like an
object whose feelings and emotions don't matter-a living organism that
must be preserved no matter how much suffering and indignity might be
entailed. 46 Protection of these critical interests-patient dignity and wellbeing-warrants recognition of a constitutional right to a surrogate decision
when a mentally disabled person's critical medical interests are at stake.
The saga of Sheila Pouliot illustrated the deplorable consequences of
ignoring such a right.

147

In 1990, however, the Supreme Court effectively rejected the argument
that a profoundly disabled person has a federal constitutional right to have
critical medical decisions made by a surrogate acting according to the
patient's interests. 148 In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, the
Court considered a challenge to Missouri's restrictive policy regarding endof-life decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients. Twenty-nine
year-old Nancy Cruzan had been involved in a catastrophic car accident that
caused her severe brain damage and rendered her permanently
unconscious. 149 Ms. Cruzan's parents sought a court order to end the
artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) sustaining their daughter. 50 The
Supreme Court of Missouri-in contrast to cases like Quinlan and Drabick
in other states-refused to authorize cessation of ANH in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cruzan had previously expressed
opposition to life support in such a medical circumstance.' 5' In announcing
145. Id. See also Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.W.),
482 N.W.2d 60, 68-69 (Wis. 1992) (affirming guardian's right to end life support for a
seventy-nine year-old incompetent in a a permanent vegetative state). Unfortunately, courts
in both California and Wisconsin have since adopted more restrictive guidelines for
surrogate end-of-life decisions. Both states confine a surrogate's prerogative to end life
support to instances where the patient is permanently unconscious or where the stillconscious patient previously gave clear and convincing instructions declining treatment or
previously appointed a health care agent. See Spahn v. Eisenberg (Guardianship of Edna
M.F.), 543 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Wis. 1997); Wendland v. Wendland (Conservatorship of
Wendland), 28 P.3d 151, 162-63 (Cal. 2001).
146. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424 (Mass. 1977); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Mass. 1982); Conservatorship of Valerie
N., 707 P.2d 760, 773 (Cal. 1985).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
148. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990).
149. Id. at 266.
150. Id. at 265.
151. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1989).
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a stringent standard for removing life support,' 52 the Missouri court upheld
the state's "unqualified interest" in preserving life in light of fears that
surrogates would make arbitrary quality-of-life decisions in the absence of a
clear expression of a patient's wishes.153 The court found no violation of
Ms. Cruzan's constitutionally protected liberty interest, reasoning that the
exercise of that interest required either an autonomous
patient or clear cut
154
choice when the patient was previously autonomous.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Ms. Cruzan's
parents argued that Missouri's restrictive policy for allowing removal of life
support violated Ms. Cruzan's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
having medical choices made for her in a way that best reflected her
interests and values.'
Their premise was that the Constitution guarantees
freedom from unwarranted bodily invasions, and that a surrogate would
protect this interest by rejecting inappropriate medical treatment.
According to Ms. Cruzan's parents and their supporting amici curiae, Ms.
Cruzan was constitutionally entitled to an individualized decision about her
medical treatment by people who loved her, who had her best interests at
heart, and who were familiar with what she would have wanted, all without
the onerous requirement of clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Cruzan
had explicitly articulated a desire to reject treatment in case of permanent
56
unconsciousness. 1
The Court, by a five-to-four margin, upheld Missouri's clear and
convincing evidence standard. 57 While the Court assumed that a competent
patient would have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment, 58 it did not extend the protection to end-oflife decision-making on behalf of an incompetent patient. 59 The Court
deferred to Missouri's restriction on surrogate choice as a rational and

152. Compare Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426 with Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854 and In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing patient autonomy exercised through
surrogates).
153. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
154. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
155. Brief for Petitioners at 33, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
156. See Brief for Petitioners at 33, Brief Amicus Curiae of the Society for the Right to
Die at 7, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (not only attacking
Missouri's restrictive decision-making standard but also arguing for recognition of the
patient's constitutional interest in having medical decisions on her behalf made by her loving
and devoted family). In effect, petitioners were asserting a constitutional claim on the part
of a bonded surrogate decision-maker. Id.
157. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83.
158. Id. at279.
159. Id. at280.
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160 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
legitimate exercise of state regulation.
for the Court, endorsed the state's insistence on clear and convincing
evidence as "a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient
while competent.' 16 1 Missouri's standard would, according to Rehnquist's
opinion, effectively prevent abuse and arbitrariness in making critical
62 According to the Court, the
medical decisions for incompetent patients.
dangers of such abuse and error in end-of-life decisions militated against
requiring states to confer broad "substituted judgment" authority upon
63

surrogates.

The Court's narrow view of surrogate-facilitated patient autonomy
became the law of the land in Cruzan; however, it was unwise
jurisprudence when it was decided, and remains unwise jurisprudence
today. First, the Court failed to recognize that Missouri's overly-restrictive
policy was arbitrary to the extent it was bound to produce results that would
defeat the principles it was intended to further. Missouri's insistence on a
living will or another clear expression of a patient's wishes was aimed at
assuring compliance with those wishes. Yet by forbidding removal of life
support except in the relatively rare instance when a patient has left explicit
instructions for the contingency of incompetency (as with a detailed living
will), 164 the state imposed treatment on Ms. Cruzan that she almost certainly

would have refused. 65 Ms. Cruzan never indicated that she would differ
from the vast majority of American adults who do not want life-extending
medical treatment forced upon them if "treatment" means being maintained
in permanent unconsciousness or other state of total physical
dependency. 166 Indeed, in one recent survey of more than 1500 American
adults, eighty-seven percent of respondents agreed that "total physical

160.

Id. at 281.

161. Id. at 280.
162. Id. at 281.
163. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87. See also Cathleen A. Roach, Paradoxand Pandora's
Box: The Tragedy of Current Right-to-Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133,
144-45 (1991).
2 0
164. See Gerri Wills, Creating a Living Will, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 0 3/
(last
wills)
living
have
10/24/pf/livingwill (estimating that as few as 30% of baby boomers
visited Nov. 26, 2003).
165. See Buckley, supra note 65, at 299 (criticizing the Wendland case for similar
reasons).
166. See GRETCHEN STRAW & RACHELLE CUMMINS, AARP KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT,
AARP NORTH CAROLINA END OF LIFE SURVEY 8 (2003), availableat http://research.aarp.org.
[hereinafter AARP SURVEY]; R.A. Pearlman et al., Insights Pertainingto PatientAssessment
of States Worse than Death, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 35 (1993).
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dependency would be worse than death.' 6 7 Thus, when Missouri forced
life-extending treatment on the permanently unconscious Ms. Cruzan, it
imposed on her a fate that she would in all likelihood not have accepted had
she been conscious. Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that Missouri's
catch-all approach may have frustrated Nancy Cruzan's actual individual
wishes, but responded that "the Constitution does not require general rules
168
to work faultlessly."'
Of course, the Chief Justice was correct-the Constitution does not
require that legal classifications and default rules perfectly match the
problems they are intended to address. However, they must at least
substantially fulfill the goals that motivated their enactment. 69 For
example, age lines (laws establishing a minimum age for certain activities)
are generally constitutional. 70 They are intended to assure a threshold level
of maturity before persons are allowed, for example, to vote, drink, or drive.
Such laws are permissible because they substantially achieve the intended
goal of keeping immature persons off the roads and out of voting booths,
even if they are somewhat over inclusive (barring some mature persons
because they happen to be underage), or somewhat under inclusive
(granting privileges to some immature persons who are "of age").
Likewise, while a mandatory retirement age may have the undesirable
effect of prematurely forcing some still-capable workers from their jobs, it
is permissible because it also serves to cycle out of the workforce many
workers whose capabilities have declined with age. The age line thus
substantially achieves the goal motivating the policy. 17 1 By contrast,
Missouri's policy, as applied to permanently unconscious patients, would
not substantially fulfill the critical goal of furthering personal choice, since
it would contravene the real but unarticulated wishes of the vast majority of
patients who do not want life-sustaining measures when mired in a
permanently unconscious state. 172
Chief Justice Rehnquist upheld Missouri's presumption in favor of
preserving life, reasoning that a mistaken judgment to withdraw life support
is both irreversible and irremediable. 173 Yet a mistaken decision to impose
life support contrary to a patient's wishes inflicts irreparable injury in at
least three respects: 1) it almost certainly disregards the patient's will; 2) it
167.
168.
169.
Manuel
170.
171.
172.
173.

AARP SURVEY, supra at note 166.
Cruzan, 497 U.S.at 284.
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976);
v. State, 692 So. 2d 320, 341 (La. 1996).
Manuel, 692 So. 2d at 341.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
See AARP SURVEY, supra at note 166.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
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preserves an existence that the patient would deem intolerably undignified;
and 3) it sullies the survivors' memories of a once-vital person now
permanently reduced to an insentient helplessness. "[C]ontinuing treatment
for a patient who would have wanted treatment stopped is as unfortunate as
discontinuing treatment for a patient who would have wanted treatment
continued."1' 74 If respecting the wishes of an incompetent patient is the
ultimate goal, the more logical and principled approach, in the absence of
explicit expressions of the patient's wishes, is to be guided first by the
patient's known values and goals and then (if those values are not
definitive) by following what a strong majority of persons would want done
in the circumstances at hand.17 5 That approach uses the normative force of
a cultural preference for humane and dignified treatment.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Cruzan, correctly perceived the
paradoxical and undesirable consequences of a state requiring explicit prior
76 While Brennan
expressions as a condition of removing life support.
acknowledged a state interest in providing Ms. Cruzan with a course of
177
he strongly criticized the
treatment that reflected her personal wishes,
cut prior expressions
clear
majority for sanctioning Missouri's insistence on
78 According to Brennan,
as the sole determinant of Ms. Cruzan's wishes.
Missouri's framework discarded evidence of Ms. Cruzan's values and
ignored meaningful, if less than carefully articulated, prior expressions and
thereby deprived her of a "right to179a decision as closely approximating her
own choice as humanly possible.'
Cruzan's defects extend beyond the glaring discrepancy between the
accepted goal of respecting the patient's wishes and the means chosen by
Missouri to accomplish that objective. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
also failed to adequately consider the critical interests threatened by the
174. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11 (2d ed. 1988). See also David
J. Mays & Martin Gunderson, Vitalism Revitalized, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July 2002, at 14,
19; Nancy K. Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 HAv. L. REV. 375,436 (1988).
175. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. 1990) ("Courts in substituted judgment
cases have also acknowledged the importance of probing the patient's value system as an aid
in discerning what the patient would choose."); In re Bryant 542 A.2d 1216, 1220 (D.C.
1988) ("It was not error for the trial court to consider whether a reasonable person in
appellant's position would have chosen freedom over hospitalization."); Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1258 (Md. App. 1982). This approach would
obviously require courts to make determinations about cultural norms. As explicated above,
the cultural norms concerning vegetative-state life support are persuasively clear. In medical
care situations for which norms are not as clearly established, however, a court would be
correct in applying a general presumption in favor of preserving life.
176. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 312-14.
177. Id. at 315-16.
178. Id. at 323-24.
179. Id. at 330.
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inflexible prerequisite of explicit prior expressions for withdrawal of life
support. Missouri's policy strongly impeded surrogates in protecting
patients' essential and constitutionally-assured interests of bodily integrity,
avoidance of suffering, and human dignity.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, called attention to the threat that Missouri's
narrow decision-making scheme posed to patients' constitutional interests
and condemned the majority for neglecting those interests.180 Justice
Stevens aptly noted that, under Missouri law, the only incapacitated patients
who were assured of protection of their bodily integrity and concomitant
freedom from unwarranted bodily invasions were those few who had the
foresight to articulate unambiguous prior instructions. 8' Justice Stevens
also recognized an incapacitated patient's interests in avoiding suffering
(though suffering was not applicable to the unconscious Ms. Cruzan), in
being remembered as a vital individual (i.e., in preserving a lifelong image),
and in obtaining a life closure consistent with her values, beliefs, and
preferences, even if those preferences are not spelled out in detail. 82
A permanently unconscious patient like Ms. Cruzan also has an
important interest in having her intrinsic human dignity respected. Ms.
Cruzan's counsel vividly portrayed the degrading limbo to which Missouri
was condemning her:
Her unconscious biological shell will be maintained by strangers in a
sterile hospital room for 30 years, devoid of thought or perception and
without hope of recovery. Such a choice will severely compromise her
dignity for the rest
of her days and will have devastating life-long effects
83
for her family. 1
Justice Stevens assailed as a denial of personhood Missouri's disregard
for Ms. Cruzan's interests beyond mere biological existence, 184 recalling the
admonition in Saikewicz and Drabick that respect for persons demands
allowing surrogates to consider the incapacitated patient's interests rather
than imposing a technological imperative to keep the patient alive at all
180. Id.at 352-55.
181. Id. at 335-36.
182. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342-44.
183. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990). Ms. Cruzan's limbo did not endure thirty years. After the Supreme Court's
decision, her parents presented "new" evidence about Nancy Beth's prior expressions. That
evidence was enough to prompt a trial court to find "clear and convincing" proof of her
wishes to have ANH removed. The gastrostomy tube was then removed and Nancy Beth
Cruzan was allowed to die. William L. Leschensky, Note, ConstitutionalProtection of the
"Refusal-of-Treatment": Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Departmentof Health, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 248, 259 (1990).
184. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 352-53.
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costs.185 Justice Stevens thus clearly understood the connection between
preserving the human dignity of a mentally incapacitated patient and
allowing her the benefit of surrogate decision-making.
The Cruzan majority, by contrast, demonstrated little concern for the
potentially dire consequences of Missouri's restrictions on debilitated,
dying patients. Ms. Cruzan's sad condition had perhaps one advantage:
because she was unconscious, she was unable to perceive the affronts to her
interests inflicted by Missouri's rule. But not every dying patient who has
not given prior instructions is so unaware. Philip Peters has commented:
"The irrebutable presumption that all lives are worth living will condemn
many patients to unnecessary treatment, suffering, indignity, or pointless
existence." ' 186 Often the most acute suffering and indignity is visited upon
those dying patients who are still conscious. Courts have long recognized
that, for some dying patients, the burdens of continued existence outweigh
the benefits, and that conscientious surrogates should be able to make such
187
medical intervention.
a judgment and order a cessation of life-sustaining
Recall the case of Sheila Pouliot, the profoundly disabled woman who
lingered in semi-consciousness for two months, swollen with edema and
unable to interact with her environment except to moan in pain. That was
her fate because New York law would not allow removal of life support
18
cut prior instructions. 1
from a dying person in the absence of clear
Consider also the case of infants born with certain grave defects that will
inexorably cause their deaths in infancy or early childhood. In some such
instances, continued existence entails almost constant medical intervention
and unremitting suffering. Solicitude for the infant demands that a surrogate
be able to put an end to medical intervention that is prolonging extreme and
unremitting suffering.' 89 Even the restrictive federal regulations aimed at
185. Id. at 349 n.21. Justice Brennan also invoked Drabick and its notion that respect
for persons demands allowing surrogates to take incapacitated persons' interests into
account. Id. See also Strasser, supra note 29, at 756.
186. Philip G. Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservationof Life: From Quinlan to
Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 943 (1989). Jonathan Moreno comments in a similar vein:
"ITihe Cruzan approach] prevents families from making humane, common sense decisions
for their loved ones, prolongs pain, suffering, and frustration for all concerned, and
exacerbates the fiscal realities that lurk in the background." Jonathan Moreno, Who's to
Choose? Surrogate Decision-making in New York State, HASTrNGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 6.
187. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (N.J. 1985); Rasmussen v. Fleming,
741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445,457 (Wash. 1987).
188. See supra text accompanying note 54.
189. See Orange County Soc. Serv. Agency v. Moises 1.(In re Christopher 1.), 131 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 122, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Del.
1991); Truselo v. Carroll, CNOO-09299, 2000 WL 333242536, at *15 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept,
19, 2000); In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 466 (D.C. 1999); Holum v. Morgan (In re C.A.), 603
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regulating decisions to withhold medical treatment from afflicted newborns
leave some leeway for withholding treatment where medical intervention
would be "virtually futile and inhumane."' 90
Thus, in Cruzan, the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold Missouri's
approach to end-of-life decision-making for the mentally disabled imperiled
both the constitutional interests of incapacitated patients like Nancy Cruzan
and the temporal welfare of other, conscious dying patients. While the
Court accepted the premise that Ms. Cruzan, if competent, would be
constitutionally entitled to reject life support, 19' the prerogative of a
conscientious surrogate to end unwanted medical intervention in Missouri
existed only if Ms. Cruzan had been so prescient as to anticipate and
articulate her desires concerning medical intervention in a permanently
unconscious state. Once Ms. Cruzan lost competence without leaving
explicit instructions, the state could erect a "protective" bar to any terminal
decision even if the bar contradicted her likely wishes or resulted in an
impingement on her bodily integrity and dignity interests. The Court found
Missouri's concern about exploitation of vulnerable patients to be a
sufficient constitutional justification, a rational basis, for the state policy.
What should the Supreme Court have done in Cruzan? What
constitutional doctrine should have been crafted to deal with medical
decision-making for an incompetent patient like Nancy Cruzan? The better
jurisprudential course would have been to acknowledge a formerly
competent person's strong liberty interest in having her preexisting values
and preferences (not just explicit end-of-life expressions) govern medical
decisions and to recognize every incapacitated patient's constitutional right
to have her contemporaneous well-being considered by a surrogate
decision-maker acting on the patient's behalf. Justice Stevens was correct
when he suggested that the Constitution "requires the State to care for
Nancy Cruzan's life in a way that gives appropriate respect to her own best
interests."' 192 Appropriate respect in this context means having a
N.E.2d 1171, 1182-83 (I11.App. Ct. 1992). Butsee Miller v. HCA, No. 01-0079, 2003 WL
22232090 at *11 (Tex. Sept. 30, 2003) (permitting a physician to give life-sustaining
treatment to a newborn in spite of parents' refusal to consent); Montalvo v. Borkevec, 647
N.W.2d 413, 421 (Wis. 2002) ("[T]here is a presumption that continued life is in the best
interests of the patient.").
190. See Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 15, at
1602-03 (discussing the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984).
191. The Rehnquist opinion assumed arguendo that a competent patient would have
such a right. Seven years later Chief Rehnquist acknowledged what had been implied in
Cruzan-that a competent person has a constitutional right to reject life-sustaining medical
intervention. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
192. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331. See also Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to
Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE L.J. 1215, 1218 (2002) (favoring a
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conscientious surrogate consider the patient's interests (including prior
93 For profoundly
values and preferences, as well as current well being).'
disabled persons who were never competent, prior values and preferences
were not autonomously formed, 194 so a surrogate's focus must be on the
patient's well-being. Consideration of current well-being, in turn, means
that a surrogate must weigh the benefits and burdens of the contemplated
medical choice while using the patient's overall best interests as a guide. In
end-of-life contexts, a surrogate ought to be able to conclude, where
appropriate, that a disabled patient would be better off dead than alive
because of unremitting suffering or grievous debilitation (to the point of
intrinsic indignity), and to order the removal of life support. A "best
interests" formula respects the incapacitated patient's interests by
permitting a range of beneficial options similar to those available to
competent patients and by making room for both the patient's well-being
and intrinsic dignity to be considered as integral factors.
There is only one context in which the Supreme Court has required,
under the rubric of liberty and substantive due process, that a state permit a
surrogate to protect an incapacitated person's constitutional interests. The
Court has required states that impose a parental notification requirement on
minors seeking abortions to also provide a process by which a minor can
avoid parental notification/consent by seeking judicial approval of the
abortion. The Court has held that a judge involved in such a proceeding
9
The
must consider the best interests of the minor as determinative.'
to
unwilling
minor
any
to
available
made
be
must
judicial bypass process
a
to
access
mandatory
involve her parents in the abortion decision. This
neutral decision-maker who is required to consider the minor's best
interests is aimed at safeguarding the minor's liberty interest in deciding
constitutional right to a surrogate's determination); Deborah K. McKnight & Maureen
Bellis, ForegoingLife-Sustaining Treatment for Adult, Developmentally Disabled, Public
Wards: A Proposed Statute, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 213 (1992) (urging incapacitated
persons' "right to have appropriate medical decisions made on their behalf').
193. See Strasser, supra note 29, at 739; John Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional
Status of Nontreatment Decisionsfor Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139, 1187
(1991). Contra Wendland v. Wendland (Conservatorship of Wendland), 28 P.3d 151, 16263 (Cal. 2001); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 407-08 (Mich. 1995).
194. The fact that a profoundly disabled person cannot make autonomous choices does
not mean that the person's preferences and expressions can be ignored. These expressions
are integral to a surrogate's assessment of a ward's feelings and interests as part of a best
interests calculus.
195. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643
(1979). See generally Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases,
30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 589 (2002); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family PrivacyAfter
Troxel and Carhart,48 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1165-66 (2001).
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whether to terminate a pregnancy. But the mandatory access is not confined
to mature minors capable of some measure of self-determination as to an
abortion decision; immature minors are also entitled to pursue a judicial
96
bypass in which the minor's interests are carefully considered.
The Court's jurisprudence on minors' abortions is instructive as an
analogy to the broader issue of medical decision-making for the profoundly
disabled. In both settings, a fundamental liberty interest is at stake; in one,
the liberty interest is in continuing or terminating a pregnancy, and in the
other, the liberty interest is in receiving or refusing critical medical
treatment. In both settings, a state's failure to allow surrogate choice
relegates the legally/medically incapacitated patient to the medical status
quo, thus offending the patient's human dignity by preventing anyone from
making a decision accounting for her interests. In both settings, an
incapacitated person's liberty interest should trigger a requirement that a
surrogate be allowed to choose among medical options in accordance with
the dependent person's interests. The Court's jurisprudence as to minor
abortions supports the proposition that constitutional liberty should include
surrogate choice when a mentally incapacitated person is incapable of
choosing for herself.
This suggested constitutional regimen furthering surrogate medical
choice would necessarily include several protections. First, the surrogate's
decision-making authority would have to be constrained in a manner
consistent with the patient's interests. Unbridled authority in the hands of a
surrogate would raise the specter of arbitrary decision-making and
unconscionable exploitation of the vulnerable person. An integral part of
the traditional relationship between government and citizens is the state's
parens patriae obligation to protect vulnerable persons from abuse.197
Thus, a surrogate's decision-making prerogative must be bound by
standards such as substituted judgment, if a previously-competent patient
has left meaningful guidance about the decision, or best interests, where the
previously-competent patient left no meaningful guidance or if the patient is
never-competent.
The importance of limitations on surrogate discretion is illustrated by
several cases in which limitations were impliedly or explicitly imposed on
decision-making about the sterilization of profoundly disabled persons.198
196.

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 ("[E]very minor must have the opportunity.., to go

directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents.").
197.

In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981). See generally Douglas R. Rendleman,

ParensPatriaefrom Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 204, 240 (197 1).
198. N.C. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. N.C., 420 F. Supp. 451, 455-56 (M.D. N.C.
1976); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1385 (M.D. Ala. 1974). See William A. Krais,

Note, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of Self-Determination:
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Courts in older cases struck down statutory schemes giving parents or
guardians unlimited discretion to secure sterilization for profoundly
disabled wards. The judicial message was that any decisions about
sterilization must be made in the best interests of the ward. Courts
delivered a similar message in several cases in the 1980s that affirmed a
surrogate's authority to seek sterilization in the best interests of a child or
ward. 199
In a constitutional framework assuring beneficial surrogate choice, the
state would have to do more than simply articulate a limiting standard, such
as best interests, to protect the disabled person from abuse by surrogates. A
state would be required to allow surrogate choice on behalf of a profoundly
disabled person, but would have a concomitant obligation to protect the
dependent person against surrogate abuse. Pursuant to parens patriae
authority, a state customarily enforces fiduciary standards that apply to a
parent or guardian who makes decisions on behalf of a mentally disabled
individual.2 0 Similar fiduciary standards would apply to surrogates making
decisions for medically-disabled persons, and states would likewise be
expected to enforce those standards. States would use criminal law to
punish serious deviations from acceptable guardianship standards, and civil
machinery to actively intervene and supplant surrogate decisions
inconsistent with the well-being of the ward. Many states already have
agencies that oversee child protection and adult guardianship that could
readily assume oversight of medical surrogate decision-making.2 °1
What about state prophylactic rules that bar entire subject areas from
surrogate choice in order to prevent mistreatment of vulnerable disabled
populations? 2 0 2 This was Missouri's rationale in Cruzan for barring
surrogate end-of-life decisions in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's explicit wishes. While a state does have a

Right-to-Die,Sterilization,and Institutionalization,15 AM. J.L. & MED. 333, 342 (1989).
199. See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 376 (Colo. 1981); Harbin v. W.S. (In re P.S.),
452 N.E.2d 969, 974 (Ind. 1982); In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781,783 (Me. 1985).
200. Grady, 426 A.2d at 479. See generally Michael Kindred, Guardianships and
Limitations on Capacity, in MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW 85 (Michael

Kindred et al. eds., 1976).
201. For description of the kinds of agencies that protect developmentally disabled
persons against abuse, see McKnight & Bellis, supra note 192, at 217-19.
202. Many states foreclose guardians from making determinations on troublesome issues
such as psychosurgery, electroconvulsive treatment, sterilization, or civil commitment. See
Bruce Winick, Advance Directive Instrumentsfor Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 57, 79 (1996). These state provisions do not, however, exclude all access by disabled
persons to such controversial services. Judges can ordinarily authorize resort to the services
in issue as part of equity courts' parens patriae authority to act in the best interests of
helpless populations.
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legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable populations, it oversteps its
constitutional bounds when it uses sweeping means to further that interest
absent compelling justification. When those means encroach on a
fundamental liberty interest, as Missouri's restrictions on decisions about
life-sustaining medical intervention did, a state must provide more
justification than did Missouri. A state ought to be able to exclude an entire
category of potentially beneficial medical decisions from surrogate choice
only upon a showing of significant abuse, or the threat of such abuse, by
surrogates. Missouri made no showing that patients had been exploited so
as to justify its virtually wholesale exclusion of surrogate choice from endof-life decision-making. Moreover, even if there appeared to be a
substantial threat of abuse of surrogate authority, a state should have to
consider less drastic protective measures before excluding an entire subject
matter from surrogate control. °3
A variety of alternative safeguards is available to ensure that surrogate
decisions affecting the disabled are not abusive. For example, the best
interests standard can be refined to more thoroughly explicate the factors
that govern a surrogate's decision. In the context of sterilization, best
interests should focus on the physical and mental needs of the disabled
patient and on the availability of alternative contraceptive techniques. 204
Further, surrogates and medical personnel should be admonished not to
allow common prejudices and stereotypes about disabled persons to play a
role in surrogate decision-making.0 5 Medical personnel should also be
reminded of their duty to seek review from an ethics committee or a court
when a surrogate medical decision seems inconsistent with acceptable
standards of patient care.

206

In addition to carefully articulating a standard for surrogate decisionmaking, a state can develop procedural safeguards to ensure that the
standards are enforced. A surrogate decision made by a parent or guardian
can be subjected to mandatory independent review, such as by an
institutional ethics committee. That mechanism can scrutinize both the
underlying facts and the surrogate's application of the relevant decision203. See Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 772 (Cal. 1985) (striking down a
statute that excessively restricted surrogate decision-making regarding sterilization).
204. See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981); In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635,
641 (Wash. 1980). Cf In re Branning, No. 82662, 1998 Ill. Lexis 6, 19 (I11. 1998)
(invalidating a statutory scheme ibr authorization of electroconvulsive therapy because of
inadequately detailed decision-making standards).
205. The New Jersey Supreme Court was careful to issue such a warning when it
articulated standards for judicial approval of sterilization applications affecting profoundly
disabled persons. Grady, 426 A.2d at 472.
206.

AMA, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, POLICY E-2.20, available at

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2498.html.
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making criteria to those facts.2 °7 In the case of sterilization decisions,
decision-making authority can be vested in a judge charged with deciding
after fair hearing processes. Typical hearing requirements for a sterilization
decision include appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the
incapacitated person's interests and appointment of independent medical
experts. 20 8 Another possible safeguard is to adjust the standard of proof
utilized by the surrogate decision-maker. For example, end-of-life and
sterilization determinations have often been subject to a standard of clear
and convincing evidence that the incapacitated patient's interests dictate a
particular medical course. 20 9 These kinds of safeguards provide alternative
means to curb abusive treatment of disabled persons short of preventing all
access to a possibly beneficial surrogate medical decision.
This approach to the issues considered in Cruzan still leaves issues
unresolved. For example, as to the question of who decides on behalf of a
disabled person, could a state require judicial determination of all critical
medical issues affecting a profoundly disabled person, including end-of-life
determinations? Parents and guardians seeking to act as surrogates would
certainly argue that a requirement of judicial authorization is unduly
burdensome, entailing too much expense and delay.210 In Cruzan, Justice
Stevens characterized as an open question whether the judicial process
could be imposed as a prerequisite to a withdrawal of life support.21'
Also controversial would be the standard of proof that surrogates would
apply in making decisions. Some would argue that a conscientious
surrogate ought to have discretion to make a judgment about a ward's best
interests without being bound to a standard of clear and convincing
evidence. However, as already noted, many states have imposed a

207. For a model framework designed to provide non-judicial review of surrogate endof-life decisions, see McKnight & Bellis, supra note 192, at 228-3 1. That model-applicable

to surrogate end-of life decisions for institutionalized patients-includes independent
medical review and scrutiny by an institutional ethics committee as well as an agency
charged with protecting the developmentally disabled.
208. See Eric M. Jaegers, Note, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative Rights of
Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreationand Sterilization, 31 U.

J. FAM. L. 947, 962-63 (1992) (describing the procedural safeguards typically
mandated for sterilization hearings).
209. See, e.g., K.C.M. v. Alaska (In re C.D.M.), 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); In re
Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783 (Me. 1985); In re Hilstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (Wash. 1980).
210. While I argue that Fourteenth Amendment liberty should be deemed to require
giving a mentally disabled person access to a surrogate's decision regarding potentially
beneficial medical issues, I do not contend that the Constitution dictates who that surrogate
decision-maker must be. In other words, allocation of serious medical decisions to judges
would be constitutional, even though it would not be sound public policy.
LOUISVILLE

211.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342 n.13.
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requirement of clear and convincing evidence of best interests, a standard
that is likely constitutional, though imprudent. The Supreme Court upheld
a state provision that required a pregnant minor seeking a judicial bypass of
a parental notification requirement to show by clear and convincing
evidence that notification would not be in her best interests.21 2 While a
clear and convincing evidence standard is constitutionally tolerable, any
higher standard would probably be unconstitutional.
For example,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to surrogate
21 3
action would probably be an unconstitutional barrier to surrogate choice.
A requirement that a surrogate medical decision be grounded on clear
and convincing evidence of best interests may be constitutionally tolerable,
but it would not be wise policy. Recall that most medical decisions involve
fundamental liberty interests on both sides of the choice. A decision in
favor of sterilization impacts a disabled person's right to procreate and right
to bodily integrity, but a decision against sterilization can impact a right not
to procreate. A decision to institute chemotherapy on a terminal cancer
patient implicates the patient's interests in bodily integrity and in continued
life, but a decision against chemotherapy preserves bodily integrity and
exercises a right to reject life-sustaining medical intervention. Given that
the surrogate medical choice inevitably implicates a range of important
personal interests, a case can be made for allowing the surrogate to act on a
preponderance of the evidence. 1 4 Medical uncertainty may often preclude
any sort of clear and convincing conclusion, as medical determinations are
frequently muddled by conflicting variables and the vagaries of professional
judgment. On the other hand, a surrogate will almost always be able to
determine after careful consideration of the patient's circumstances and
values that her best interests probably lie in a particular direction.
Even when important constitutional interests lie on both sides of a
decision, the potential harm may appear greater on one side than the other.
A decision in favor of sterilization entails a significant bodily invasion and
severe impact on procreation prospects, while a decision against
sterilization leaves the disabled person alone. This fact, coupled with a
history of mistreatment of profoundly disabled persons, accounts for the
common legal requirement that a surrogate's consent to a ward's
212. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1997). For cases suggesting that clear
and convincing evidence of the incapacitated patient's best interests is a constitutional
prerequisite to invasion of bodily integrity, see In re Branning, No. 82662, 1998 111.Lexis 6,
19 (Ill. 1998); In re Hilstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
213. Robert v. Angela D. (Conservatorship of Angela D.), 70 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 141821(1999).
214. See Buckley, supra note 65, at 303-04 (criticizing a clear and convincing evidence
standard in the context of refusal of medical intervention).
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sterilization be based upon clear and convincing evidence. 21 5 Nonetheless,
if failure to perform sterilization would pose a serious risk of medical
trauma for the patient, the balance of harms is not so clear. The same is true
where a contemplated surgery involves a serious bodily intrusion yet failure
to perform the surgery seriously endangers the patient's life. A
preponderance of the evidence standard is therefore defensible 2 16 and
perhaps even wise.
The constitutional approach proposed here, which recognizes a right to
have a surrogate weigh important medical options, would also cast doubt
upon some limitations on surrogate choice found in some state advance
directive legislation. One common statutory limitation confines decisions
to withhold treatment pursuant to previously issued instructions to a point at
which an incompetent patient is "terminal." Sometimes, terminal is defined
to mean that the patient's death will unavoidably occur within a particular
time span (like six months).21 7 Such a terminal patient limitation excludes
surrogate decisions (despite conformity to patient wishes or well-being) to
end dialysis or other interventions capable of sustaining the life of a dying
patient for a period longer than the statutory period. Yet a competent
patient's right to decline treatment is not confined to the terminal stages of
an illness, and it is doubtful whether there is a constitutionally sustainable
justification for so confining a surrogate. A patient suffering from a
degenerative disease may reach an intolerable level of decline long before
the ultimate statutory period. The same constitutional infirmity affects
some state surrogacy laws designating the next of kin as authorized
decision-makers for incapacitated patients.2! 1 8 Some of these statutes
empowering next of kin to act as medical decision-makers confine the
decision-makers' authority regarding end-of-life decisions to circumstances
in which the ward is terminal. Similar constitutional doubt hangs over
advance directive legislation purporting to forbid withdrawal of ANH as a
surrogate option. No persuasive government interest warrants treating
ANH differently from other forms of medical intervention.
There will also be dispute about the elements that can constitutionally be
considered as part of a "best interests of the patient" decision-making
standard. Can the interests of others, such as caretakers, be included in a
surrogate's decision-making, or must the disabled person's interests be the

215. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
216. Cf Wirsing v. Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv. (In re Wirsing), 573 N.W.2d
51, 55 (Mich. 1998) (rejecting a clear and convincing proof standard for sterilization).
217. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250(B).
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 2002).
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exclusive focus? Can a surrogate decision to authorize an "altruistic"
course, such as tissue donation or participation in non-therapeutic medical
research, be reconciled with the best interests limitation? Can the patient's
dignity be a legitimate consideration, or must the surrogate focus on the
physical and mental well being of the now-incompetent patient? The
resolution of these issues is beyond the scope of this article.2 19
The basic point is that Cruzan was wrongly decided, and that
constitutional liberty demands that, in most contexts affecting an
incapacitated person's critical interests, the person is entitled to a surrogate
determination predicated on the interests of the incapacitated person.22 ° The
proposed constitutional right to a surrogate determination at least applies to
the important, potentially beneficial medical decisions at the heart of this
article.
To this point, the constitutional analysis has centered on the Cruzan case,
which involved a previously competent person who had permanently lost
cognitive capacity. However, the subject of this article is persons who are
profoundly disabled from birth. Does the constitutional analysis change
when the medical fate of a never-competent person is at issue? There are
some distinctions between previously competent persons and nevercompetent persons, but they probably do not change the essential argument
in favor of a constitutional right to have critical medical determinations
made by a surrogate bound to respect the incapacitated person's interests.
In fact, there is arguably a stronger case to be made on behalf of a nevercompetent person than for a previously competent person like Ms. Cruzan.
One distinction between the previously competent and never-competent
patient relates to the-personal interests affected if a state prohibits surrogate
decisions on behalf of a now-incompetent patient. Unlike a nevercompetent person, a previously competent patient's self-determination
interest may be at stake. The previously competent patient had, until her
incapacitation, an opportunity to exercise personal choice and to express
preferences and values, so that state constraints on surrogate choice may
impede implementation of that dependent person's constitutional liberty in
the sense of autonomous choice. For example, Ms. Cruzan by age twentyseven had had an opportunity to form personal values and preferences and
to express specific choices that would inform others of how she would want
to resolve the issue of life support in case of permanent unconsciousness. A

219. For further discussion of these issues see Norman L. Cantor, "Deciding for the
Profoundly Mentally Disabled" (forthcoming 2004).
220. This is so only as to most contexts because a few exclusions of surrogate choice for
profoundly disabled persons such as those regarding marriage and voting can be sustained as
necessary to the integrity of the institution involved.
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profoundly disabled person never has the capacity for this level of selfdetermination, so the prohibition on surrogate choice as to end-of-life care
does not violate that disabled person's liberty in the sense of personal
choice. To that extent, the constitutional claim of a profoundly disabled
person is weaker than that of a previously competent person.
On the other hand, the negative consequences of an approach like
Missouri's would be even more severe on a life-long profoundly disabled
person than they were on Ms. Cruzan. As a formerly competent person,
Nancy Beth Cruzan had some opportunity to speak to the matter of end-oflife medical treatment in a fashion that would meet Missouri's clear and
convincing evidence standard. Indeed, her representatives eventually
satisfied a Missouri court that Ms. Cruzan had previously expressed enough
about her preferences to show clearly that she would prefer death to
permanent unconsciousness. 221 A lifelong profoundly disabled person has
no opportunity to meet the Missouri standard.
Another contrast between Ms. Cruzan and the life-long profoundly
disabled patient is that Ms. Cruzan, as a permanently insensate person,
could not consciously experience the consequences of Missouri's insistence
that she be kept alive in her gravely debilitated status. Most profoundly
disabled persons are well aware of their surroundings and quite capable of
experiencing acute suffering or affronts to dignity from intrusive medical
technology. Recall the Massachusetts court's determination that Joseph
Saikewicz would suffer so much in terms of pain, anxiety, and frustration
from the uncomprehending receipt of intrusive chemotherapy that he would
be better off foregoing possibly life-sustaining medical intervention.222
Recall Sheila Pouliot who lay moaning for two months as edema swelled
her body and broke down her skin.223 Avoidance of unnecessary suffering
has even been recognized by a number of Supreme Court justices as an
interest of constitutional dimension safeguarded by the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 24

221. See Leschensky, supra note 183, at 259.
222. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
224. In 1997, the Court decided two cases in which it upheld laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997). However, in concurring opinions, several justices suggested that they would
likely find unconstitutional a state ban on effective pain relief to dying patients, even if the
pain relief would hasten the patient's demise.

Commentators have suggested that these

judicial expressions reflect an emerging constitutional "right to be free of unnecessary pain
and suffering at the end-of-life." David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-Assisted
Suicide After Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 161, 223 (1999). See also David J.
Garrow, The Right to Die: Death with Dignity in America, 68 Miss. L.J. 407, 417-19 (1998);
Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks - Not Assisted Suicide But a ConstitutionalRight
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A state's policy of excluding surrogate choice could have severe negative
consequences for profoundly disabled persons in contexts beyond end-oflife treatment decisions. Once a profoundly disabled woman becomes
pregnant, her medical circumstances and her incomprehension of the events
taking place may make an abortion the only way to avoid torturous
consequences.22 5 State exclusion of such an option would be cruel and
inhumane. The medical circumstances of a profoundly disabled person
might also make sterilization necessary to avoid severe physical or mental
harm. Severe mental distress from menstruation or severe hazards from
pregnancy can even prompt a conclusion that, absent sterilization, a
profoundly disabled person will undergo "devastating and perhaps fatal"
consequences.22 6 Again, categorical prohibition of surrogate choice as to
sterilization might be cruel and inhumane.
Even in the absence of medical necessity, sterilization can be in the best
interests of a profoundly disabled person, at least if the alternative is social
isolation or intrusive monitoring to avoid pregnancy. The New Jersey
Supreme Court commented in Grady:
Lee Ann should have the opportunity to lead a life as rewarding as her
condition will permit. Courts should cautiously but resolutely help her
achieve the fullness of that opportunity. If she can have a richer and
more active life only if the risk of pregnancy227is permanently eliminated,
then sterilization may be in her best interests.
When Justice Rose Bird dissented from the California Supreme Court's
authorization of sterilization for Valerie N., lamenting the prospective
deprivation of Valerie's right to procreate, Roger Dworkin responded:
What are we doing for Valerie by respecting her primal right to procreate
if we then lock her away to be sure she does not procreate, or if the
procreation experience is a frightening and awful one for2 28
her? How can
we justify making Valerie suffer for Justice Bird's ideals?

to Palliative Care, 337 N. ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997).
225. See Jolivet v. Chuhak (In re D.W.), 481 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); In re
Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1340 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); In re Jane Doe, 533 A.2d 523, 526
(R.I. 1987).
226. Robert v. Angela D. (Conservatorship of Angela D.), 70 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1417
(1999) (holding that, where a disabled woman had a seizure condition that would be
exacerbated by pregnancy, the woman had a right to have a sterilization decision made on
her behalf in order to enjoy the same benefits as a non-disabled person). See also Ruby v.
Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D. Conn. 1978); In re Susan S., No. 7764, 1996 WL75343
at *12 (Del. Ch. 1996); In re E.J. Nilsson, 122 Misc. 2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
227. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (N.J. 1981).
228. DwoRKIN, supra note 37, at 59-60.
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Professor Dworkin's point is well taken, even if couched in hyperbole.
Access to sterilization can, at least in some instances, promote a disabled
person's long-range happiness, dignity, and a fuller life.
Intrinsic human dignity has an important role in shaping the medical
handling of profoundly disabled persons. A dignitary harm occurs to
profoundly disabled persons when a state categorically excludes a
potentially beneficial class of medical decisions from the range of surrogate
decision-making authority. It is dehumanizing to the affected disabled
person when surrogates are required to preserve the medical status quo
rather than weigh the potential benefits and detriments associated with
possible medical responses. This is so whether the medical option in
229 or life support. The disabled
question relates to abortion, sterilization,
individual is treated like an inanimate object in contrast to the competent
patient who would be entitled, in comparable medical circumstances, to
230 The inhumane impact of
exercise the potentially beneficial option.
excluding potentially beneficial options from profoundly disabled persons
helps account for the slavery imagery that some commentators evoked in
the wake of Cruzan. According to that commentary, Missouri made Nancy
Cruzan a slave of medical technology. Alex Capron described Ms. Cruzan
as "enslaved by the extraordinary and ever-growing ability of medicine to
sustain vital functions., 231 Giles Scofield called Cruzan the 20th century's
equivalent of Dred Scott in its failure to "treat Nancy Cruzan as a person
instead of a slave. 232
The dehumanizing effect of prohibiting effective surrogate choice also
accounts for the previously mentioned state cases like Saikewicz, Drabick,
Grady, and Valerie N., all of which cited the dignity of the profoundly
disabled person as a basis for according surrogates a prerogative to exercise
choice regarding either end-of-life treatment or sterilization. Courts have
also begun to recognize the indignity of excluding surrogate choice in
another, unusual context, that of the customary rule that divorce is so
personal a choice that a surrogate can never initiate a divorce on behalf of a
now incompetent spouse. The venerable rule barring a surrogate petition
for divorce is grounded on the principle that a person's degree of tolerance
of spousal mistreatment is so subjective that no surrogate decision-maker
can effectively replicate what the now incompetent spouse would want.

229. "To take away the right to obtain sterilization for persons who are incapable of
exercising it personally is to degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly reliant on
other, more fortunate, individuals." Jaegers, supra note 208, at 976.
230. See Peters, supra note 186, at 960-61.
231. Capron, July 1990 talk, at 23-24.
232. Giles R. Scofield, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 44 (Sept. 1991).
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Yet, as recognized in several recent decisions,23 3 the categorical prohibition
of a surrogate petition for divorce tends to treat the now-incompetent
spouse as an object locked into the status quo no matter how abusive or
degrading the other spouse has been. These decisions see the incapacitated
spouse as a "prisoner" who can be "captive to the whims of the competent
spouse. ,234 They therefore deviate from the traditional approach and allow
surrogates to initiate divorce proceedings in order to allow full
consideration of the incapacitated spouse's interests and to assure dignified
treatment for the incapacitated spouse.
The argument to this point has been that Cruzan was wrongly decided
and that the Supreme Court should have ruled that states cannot,
constitutionally, circumscribe surrogate choice on behalf of incapacitated
persons as Missouri did. John Garvey was right and Chief Justice
Rehnquist was wrong. At the same time, the result in Cruzan was not
terribly surprising. The Court was asked to constitutionalize the handling
of incapacitated, dying patients less than fifteen years after Quinlan ruled
for the first time that a surrogate might legally be permitted to decline
further life support for a helpless patient. The Court was faced with a state
restriction on surrogate choice purportedly aimed at protecting vulnerable
persons against exploitation. Protecting vulnerable populations against
exploitation is a hallmark of the Supreme Court, a fact demonstrated not
only in Cruzan in 1990 but in the physician-assisted suicide cases seven
years later where the Court cited apprehension about undue pressure upon
dying persons as one basis for upholding state bans on assistance to suicide.
Moreover, the Court in Cruzan was not confronting a suffering disabled
person, but rather the permanently insensate Ms. Cruzan. All this helps
explain the reticence behind the five-to-four vote to uphold Missouri's law.
In any event, Cruzan is not necessarily dispositive of the focal point of
this article-the rights of profoundly disabled persons. At least those
instances where exclusion of surrogate choice forces a profoundly disabled
person to experience suffering or degradation are conceivably
distinguishable from Cruzan. The contention is that it is an impermissible
infringement of constitutional liberty (though not liberty in the sense of
autonomy) when states categorically exclude surrogates from making
potentially beneficial choices consistent with the best interests of the
profoundly disabled person. This analysis applies to any state precluding
233. Ruvalcalba v. Ruvalcalba, 850 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Vaughan v.
Vaughan (Guardianship of Vaughan), 648 So. 2d 193, 195-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806, 811-12 (N.J. Ch. 1993); Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d
335, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). Cf Newman v. Newman, 191 N.E. 2d 614, 618-619 (1963)
(allowing a surrogate to elect between alimony and a property settlement).
234. Ruvalcalba, 850 P.2d at 681; Nelson, 878 P.2d at 339-40.
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an end-of-life decision absent explicit prior expressions (an approach that
entirely forecloses a choice for a profoundly disabled person) as well as any
state barring the possibility of a sterilization procedure. This analysis
would also invalidate the federal regulations seeking to prevent parental
choice of non-treatment for infants born with multiple deficits likely to
make their lives ones of unremitting suffering.
Of course, the above constitutional analysis may not prevail. The Court
is naturally hesitant to constitutionalize legal doctrine about surrogate
choice in the face of continuing concern about surrogate exploitation of
vulnerable populations. As noted, acknowledgement of a liberty interest in
having a surrogate decide on behalf of the disabled patient implicates
subsidiary constitutional questions about who can serve as surrogate, the
procedures to be followed by the surrogate, and the permissible scope of
surrogate discretion. The Supreme Court may prefer to leave these matters
235 without
to what Justice O'Connor dubbed "the laboratory of the states',
federal judicial intrusion. On the constitutional plane, that would still leave
state courts free to apply state constitutional provisions protecting liberty
along the lines urged.
Even if the issue of surrogate decision-making is left to public policy in
the states, i.e., to the state legislative laboratories, profoundly disabled
persons should be given a right to have critical medical decisions made by
conscientious surrogates acting according to the best interests of the
disabled person. This approach ought to apply at least in the contexts of
end-of-life decisions, abortion, and sterilization. The above analysis shows
how it is inhumane and a denial of respect for persons to exclude the
profoundly disabled from potentially beneficial surrogate decisions. A
legal approach allowing conscientious surrogate decision-making seems to
yield "a more just and compassionate result," to use the words of the New
236 The objectives of justice and
Jersey Supreme Court in Grady.
compassion surely underlie the elaborate guardianship process that every
23 7
jurisdiction now supplies on behalf of profoundly disabled persons.
Those processes are consistent with the ancient parens patriae principle
seeking to protect the interests of profoundly disabled persons. Legislatures
should, therefore, "promote the human dignity of never-competent patients
by affording access to beneficial results which competent patients could,
238 Even staunch
and likely would, choose under similar circumstances.

235.
236.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292.
Grady, 426 A.2d at 481.

237.

E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-682 (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §

700.5215 (West 2002); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30-2627 (Michie 2003).
238. Strasser, supra note 29, at 771.
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advocates on behalf of disabled persons' rights can recognize that
preclusion of surrogate choice can single out and disadvantage the
disabled.239 As protecting against abusive surrogate behavior is always a
legitimate and important concern, surrogate decision-making machinery
must include the kinds of procedural protections discussed above.
The central message of this article, then, is that the profoundly disabled
have rights similar but not identical to those of competent persons. One of
those rights-to be established either by constitutional law or legislative
policy-should be a prerogative to have a conscientious surrogate make
critical medical decisions according to the best interests of the disabled
patient.

239. Price & Burt, Nonconsensual Medical Procedures, supra note 38, at 102-03;
Michael Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations Upon Capacity, in THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 79-80 (Kindred et al. eds, 1976).
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